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CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION IN PRIVATE
SECURITIES LITIGATION: ENDANGERED

SPECIES?
"Once, long ago andfar away-say, before mid-2006-securities
class actions were almost automatically certified. "'

INTRODUCTION
In the late 1990's and in 2000, an exceptionally large number of
initial public offerings ("IPOs") traded at "extraordinary and immediate
aftermarket premiums."2 During this bubble period, a select few investors
received these "hot" allocations. 3 Regulatory agencies probed into the
impropriety of the distributions and investor confidence in the integrity of
the pricing process plummeted. 4
Furthermore, corporate accounting
5
scandals, most notably with Enron and WorldCom, ran rampant.
I John C. Coffee. Jr., Future of Class Actions Depends on Pending Cases, N.Y.L.J., March
29. 2007. at 5.
2 NYSE NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2003),
littp: '/xxww.finra.org/web/groups/rules-regs/documents/rulesjregs/pO l0373.pdf.
See id. Underwriters endowed "hot" IPO shares to senior executives of companies from
whom the underwriter aspired to acquire future investment banking business. See JAMES D. Cox
EI AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS 140 (Aspen Publishers 5th ed. 2006).

4 NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 1. Investor confidence over
the propriety of the pricing process decreased because of large first-day price increases in the
IPOs. Ild. Those select few investors who received shares of "hot" IPO allocations received an
immediate substantial profit. Id. Abusive behavior on the part of investment banks and corporate
officers resulted because their shares were guaranteed a profit and were often allocated for a
promise of future business. Id. Investigations revealed that certain underwriters and other
participants in IPOs engaged in improper and often illegal conduct contrary to the best interests of
investors and the U.S. markets. Id. This conduct was most frequent during the IPO bubble
period of the late 1990's and early in 2000. Id. The Committee proposed forward-looking
reforms to prevent future abuse. Id. at 4-19. The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
("NASD") began the underlying investigations against the investment banking firms in May
2000. Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., NASD Charges Frank Quattrone with
Spinning, Undermining Research Analyst Objectivity, Failure to Cooperate in Investigation (Mar.
6, 2003),
http://www. finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2003NewsReleases/P002948.html.
According to Mary Schapiro, NASD Vice Chairman, "Recent investigations into conflicts of
interest on Wall Street have shown that in too many cases in the past, investors' interests were
compromised for greater investment banking revenues." Id.
See Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, Aug. 26, 2002, www.forbes.com
/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html (listing corporate accounting scandals that "rocked the
markets" in early 2000's); see also Cox, supra note 3, at 9-10 (discussing both Enron's and
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In an attempt to reform the underwriters' improper IPO practices,
the New York Attorney General's Office and other regulatory agencies
entered into a $1.4 billion "Global Settlement" with the nation's top ten
investment banking firms. 6 The goal of this historic agreement was to
"balance[] reform in the industry and bolster confidence in the integrity of
equity research" along with resolving the existing conflict of interest
schemes. Additionally, enforcement actions by these agencies addressed
improper IPO arrangements. s For example, the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") and the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") filed a set of IPO rules aimed at promoting fair IPO
allocations. 9 Also, at the SEC's request, the NASD and the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") formed an IPO Advisory Committee that issued
a report recommending changes in regulations applicable to IPO
underwritings. I° These regulatory agencies also brought actions against
WorldCom's failings).
6 See Press Release, SEC, NY Attorney Gen., NASD, NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators
Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment Practices; $1.4 Billion Global Settlement
Includes Penalties and Funds for Investors (Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002179.htm (stating purpose and terms of "global settlement"). The agreement concluded a joint
investigation by the regulatory agencies into the undue influence of investment banking interests
on securities research at investment banks. Id.
7 Id. Terms of the agreement included: absolute separation
between research and investment
banking to prevent stock recommendations influenced by pressure to secure investment banking
clients: ban on IPO spinning: independent research for a five-year period; full disclosure of
analyst recommendations: and monetary sanctions totaling $1.4 billion in penalties, restitution,
and fines to be used for investor education. Id. Eliot Spitzer, former New York Attorney
General, stated, "This agreement will permanently change the way Wall Street operates." Id.
Former NASD Chairman and CEO. Robert Glauber, noted, "This settlement marks a vital step in
restoring investor confidence ...[I]t makes plain that cleaning up research and IPO practices is
not just good ethics - it's good business." Id. Former NASAA President Chris Bruen referred to
the agreement as "represent[ing] the dawn of a new day on Wall Street." Id.
8 See Roberta S. Karmel, Underwriters' Victory in Supreme Court Case, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16,
2007. at 3: see also intra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (addressing enforcement actions in
response to inappropriate activities in securities industry).
9 See Karmel, supra note 8, at 3; see also Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,
NASD: 2003 in Review (Dec. 30, 2003), http://www.finra.org/pressroom/newsreleases/2003
new sreleasesip002808 (announcing NASD's focus on IPO issues by proposing rules to promote
fair IPO allocation). The proposals "address[ed] the areas of conflicts of interest, illicit quid pro
quo arrangements, spinning and other IPO allocation abuses - along with enhancing the process
of the pricing of IPO shares." Id. In addition, the NASD established an Investor Education
Foundation to provide investors with information and tools to assist in their understanding of the
financial markets, Id.
10 See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 3-20 (recommending
changes to IPO underwriting process to securities industry). The Committee's proposals
supplemented the Global Settlement; the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; and relating regulatory
rules pertaining to analyst conflicts, corporate governance, and registered representatives. Id.at
3. The four basic themes of the recommendations included: 1)pricing of IPOs in a transparent
fashion to avoid aftermarket misrepresentations; 2) elimination of abusive allocation practices; 3)
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corporate officers at Credit Suisse First Boston ("CSFB") and Salomon
Smith Barney ("SSB"). "
In the aftermath of the high tech bubble burst and resulting

corporate scandals, individuals sought redress against underwriters.'

2

Specifically, many shareholders brought private class actions to seek
justice for their securities fraud claims.' 3 Today, despite the scandals and

reforms, "[o]nce-thriving securities-fraud lawsuits, hailed by shareholders
and bashed by businesses, are facing an onslaught of legal challenges that
could cripple the controversial class actions."'

4

Class action lawsuits are

decreasing in frequency and "[b]usinesses are stepping up their assault on
what they call frivolous litigation."'

5

improvement of the flow of and access to information regarding IPOs by regulators; and 4)
encouragement of highest possible standards for underwriters.
Id.
Following these
recommendations "the SEC approved a new rule that fosters a public distribution of IPO shares
by prohibiting the purchase of IPOs by industry 'insiders' and other persons who are in a position
to direct futures business." Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., supra note 9.
1 See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Salomon Smith Barney Fined $5
Million for Issuing Misleading Research Reports on Winstar; Charges Filed Against Jack
Grubman and Christine Gochuico (Sept. 23, 2002), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/News
Releases/2002NewsReleases/P002912 (announcing fine for SSB's issuing materially misleading
research reports in 2001 on Winstar Communications, Inc.). In March 2003, charges were
brought against Frank Quattrone, the former head of CSFB's technology sector investment
banking group, for IPO spinning violations as well as mismanaging his organization to the
detriment of research analyst objectivity. See Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., supra note 4.
12 See Karmel, supra note 8, at 3 (stating regulatory probes and private actions brought
against underwriters). For example, in one case, thousands of investors filed class actions against
310 issuers, fifty-five underwriters, and hundreds of individuals, alleging securities laws
violations due to abuses in IPO underwritings. In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d
24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006), reh 'g denied, 483 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007) [hereinafter In re IPO].
13 See Adam C. Pritchard, Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform? 2 (Univ.
of Mich., John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 03-003, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=389561 ("The recent spate of
corporate scandals has brought the class action bar to the surface, lured by the prospect of tens of
millions of dollars in attorneys' fees."). Further, the SEC commented that private class actions
are a "necessary supplement" in an effort to police fraud. Id. at 3. These class actions promised
compensation to fraud victims and "str[uck] genuine fear into the hearts of corporate executives."
Id.
14 Edward Iwata, Fewer Lawsuits Charge Securities Fraud, (Oct. 7, 2007),
http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/2007-10-07-securities-fraud-lawsuitsN.htm
?csp=
34. Class action securities fraud filings dropped far below historical averages for the fourth
consecutive six-month period beginning mid-2005 and ending mid-2007.
See News Release,
Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and Cornerstone Research, Sec.
Class Action Filings in First Half of 2007 Remain Well Below Historical Averages (July 9,
2007), http://securities.stanford.edu/scac-press/20070710 YIR07midPressRelease.pdf.
15 Iwata, supra note 14. Despite the decline in class action filings, settlements have exceeded
previous totals. See News Release, Cornerstone Research, Sec. Class Action Settlements
Skyrocket in 2006 Finds Cornerstone Research (Mar. 21, 2007), http://securities.stanford.edu/
Settlements/REVIEW_1995-2006/SettlementsThrough_12_ 2006 PR.pdf. The increase in the
total value was due to an increase in the average settlement size and not an increase in the number
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This Note, guided by Rule Twenty-Three of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure ("Rule 23") and appellate case law, explores a major
procedural hurdle that plaintiffs face during securities class action
certification.' 6 Part II examines the history of securities fraud class action
claims.' 7 Sections A and B of Part II observe the role of Rule 23 in
securities class actions by outlining the certification requirements and the
Rule's 1998 amendment that impacts these actions.' 8 In addition, Section
C takes a close look at the current circuit split over the extent to which
courts may inquire into the merits of a case in evaluating class
certification. 9 Specifically, this section compares the "some showing"
standard with the "rigorous analysis" standard behind this inter and intra
20
circuit conflict.
Part III explores the potential impact of the In re Initial Public
Offerings Securities Litigation2' [hereinafter In re IPO] decision.2 2
Specifically, issues considered in this section include: forum shopping by
the plaintiffs, extension of discovery for counsel, small investors' prospects
of going solo, and whether other federal class action suits will be
affected.23 Finally, Part IV concludes with a suggestion that at the class
certification stage, judges must allow the parties to develop and present a
full record of Rule 23 issues.24 These tough standards will likely result in
the contraction of class action certification for securities litigation.25
HISTORY

ClassAction Development and Procedures
In the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929 and during the
New Deal, Congress enacted the nation's first two pieces of federal
of cases settled. Id.
16 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (encompassing class action rule of civil procedure);
see also
Jonathan C. Dickey, Current Trends in FederalSecurities Litigation, at 417-18 (P.L.I. Corporate
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 11072, 2007) (stating Rule 23 governs federal
security class actions and case law interpretations).
17 See infra Part II.
18 See infra Parts II(A) and (B).
19 See infra Part II(C).
20 See infra text accompanying notes 46-82 (comparing conflicting circuit standards).
21 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006), rehg denied,483 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007).
22 See infra Part III.
23 See infIa notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
24 See infra Part IV.
25 See infra Part IV.
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securities legislation: the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 26 Both Acts only
provided for government enforcement of securities laws violations. 27 In
1971 the United States Supreme Court held that section 10(b) of the
Securities Act allowed for a private right of action. 28 Once the private right
of action was allowed, a litigation explosion ensued and securities suits
began to be filed as class actions under Rule 23.29 Securities 30class action

abuse followed, prompting Congress to enact litigation reform.

26 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 17-23 (Thomson / West 5th

ed. 2005) (describing antecedents of securities regulation in United States). The Securities Act
regulates the initial distribution of securities by requiring the issuer of securities to register with
the SEC and submit a prospectus prior to a public offering. Mark D. Wood, Understandingthe
Securities Law 2007: Liabilityfor Securities Laws Violations at 606-24 (P.L.I. Corporate Law
and Practice Course Handbook Series. No. 10973, 2007). This Act requires full disclosure with
the goal of providing investors with an adequate opportunity to assess the merits of an
investment. See also Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1964) (stating
purpose to "protect the naive or uninformed investor and to deny recourse to the reckless or
fraudulent seller of securities"). The Exchange Act regulates all aspects of the post-distribution
of securities. See HAZEN, supra, at 22. This Act is broader than the Securities Act because it
regulates all market exchanges as well as broker-dealers and focuses on both buyers and sellers of
securities. See id. at 22-23. Further, this Act provides the SEC with disciplinary powers. See
Wood, supra, at 589.
27 See Russell Kamerman, Note, Securities Class Action Abuse.- ProtectingSmnall Plaint/Is
Big Money, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 853, 857 (2007) (stating no private right of action when
securities laws initially enacted).
2X See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971)
(confirming an implied cause of action can be brought under Section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5).
Since 1975, the Supreme Court has taken a restrictive view of federal securities laws, especially
with regard to implied private rights of action, to the point of rejecting many SEC views. See
HAZEN, supra note 26, at 5.
21) See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (outlining class action certification requirements). Rule 23, which
governs class actions, requires a two-step analysis to determine if class certification is
appropriate. Id. First, plaintiffs must satisfy all four prerequisites for certification in Rule 23(a):
1) numerosity; 2) commonality; 3) typicality; and 4) adequacy of representation. Id. Second, the
action must also satisfy one of the conditions outlined in Rule 23(b). ld. Those injured by a
securities law violation can bring a civil action to the courts for damages under either a specific
liability provision, or they can assert an implied right of action under the provision prohibiting
such conduct. See HAZEN, supra note 26, at 5. In addition to specific violations such as "insider
trading," a large number of allegations included corporate mismanagement. See id. Plaintiffs
brought suits under federal securities laws to overcome state court restrictive decisions and
procedural obstacles. See id.
30 See HAZEN, supra note 26, at § 1.8 (articulating litigation reform). In 1995, Congress
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"). hI; see also Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2000). The PSLRA's purpose was "to prevent law
firms from paying illegal kickbacks to lead plaintiffs, to prevent class actions from being used as
strike suits, and to prevent lawyer-driven securities class actions." Kamerman, supra note 27, at
860-61. Primarily, the PSLRA increased the pleading standards in federal class actions for the
plaintiffs. See Thomas 0. Gorman, Robert J. Tannous, & William P. McGrath, Jr., Securities
Class Actions & Derivative Litigation. Issues that Keep Corporate Counsel Awake Lit Night,
BUSINESS LAW TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 2007, at 37-41. Subsequently, Congress enacted the
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FederalRules of Civil ProcedureIssue in Securities Class Actions
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA")
heightened pleading standards for securities class actions and made class
certification the critical litigation decision. 3' Historically, Rule 23 was
interpreted liberally and courts generally found class certification
appropriate for securities litigation.' - Further, "for many years, effective,
timely and meaningful appellate review of class certification order in
securities class actions was lacking."' 3 In 1998, Rule 23 was amended to
include 23(f), which allows parties to request an immediate appeal by the
circuit courts of any order granting or denying class
certification without
34
having to first obtain consent from the lower court.
This Rule, however, does not state the standard of review to
determine whether such appeal is warranted.
Each circuit court of

Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(b)) (2000). The SLUSA preempts most
securities fraud class actions involving publicly traded securities. See HAZEN, sutpra note 26, at
§1.2(3)(e). Thus, securities class actions involving fraud must be brought into federal court under
federal law. See Kamerman .supra note 26, at 864.
31 See TIIEODORE J. SAWICKI,
LITIGATION:

CRAIG H. KUGLAR & J. ALEXANDER REED, SECURITIES
FORMS AND ANALYSIS 1-86 (Thomson / West ed. 2008) (database updated July

2008). If the class is certified then there is an incentive for the defendant to settle because his
exposure is multiplied exponentially. Id. However, if the class certification is denied, then
plaintiff is left with her clain alone, and the prospect of litigation through trial is unpleasant and
financially impracticable. Id. Thus, few class actions are litigated in court. Id. See generall "
Ft D. R. Civ. P. 23, siqura note 29 and accompanying text (outlining Rule 23).
32 See SAWICKI, .supra note 31, at 1-86 to 1-89 (discussing historic interpretation of Rule 23).
1 hi. at 1-86.
34 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f). The rule states,
A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying classaction certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the
circuit clerk within 10 days after the order is entered. An appeal does not stay
proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so
orders.
Id. The purpose of the rule is to alleviate the following three concerns: I) denial of class
certification may sound the "death knell" of litigation because plaintiffs' claims are too small to
justify the expense of litigation; 2) defendant will be pressured to settle even if plaintiffs' case is
weak; and 3) most class actions are settled before an appeal and therefore fundamental issues of
class actions are poorly developed. See SAWICKI, supra note 31, at 1-86 (summarizing Advisory
Committee opinions of Rule 23(f)). Rule 23(f) gives the defendant an opportunity to seek
appellate review in a putative securities class action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(t). Appellate review
is important because "the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, [that] litigation under Rule
lOb-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in the degree and in kind from that which
accompanies litigation in general. This concern in only amplified ifa class is certified." Scott D.
Musoff, Giving Teeth to the PSLRA, N.Y.L.J., July 9, 2007, at 13.
3i See SAWICKI, supra note 31, at 1-86. However, the Rule's advisory committee's note
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appeals articulated a standard for its jurisdiction.36 The "reverse death
knell doctrine" weighs heavily on all jurisdictions and "applies where the

order granting class certification so raises the stakes for the defendant that
it will be forced to settle rather than proceeding with a 'bet the company'
trial." 37

Rule 23(f) impacted securities class actions in numerous ways by
allowing interlocutory appeals. 38 These appeals involve: (1) the basic
requirements of Rule 23 and the standard used to determine if met; (2) the

proper standard for district courts in ruling on motions for class
certification; (3) the important underlying substantive law; and (4) the
application of the "fraud-on-the-market doctrine. 0 9 Recent decisions
emphasize that trial courts should conduct a rigorous analysis of class
certification requirements and carefully analyze the evidence supporting
certification because of the impact of class certification on defendants. 4 °
Class CertificationStandards Under FED R. CIV. P. 23: In re IPO

Securities class actions were almost automatically certified before
mid-2006 because of: "(1) the 'fraud on the market doctrine' which
eliminated the need to show individual reliance[;] (2) a minimal loss
causation standard; and (3) the rule in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,4 1 that

the district court could not, at the certification stage, 'conduct a preliminary
inquiry into the merits of a suit.' 42 Classes were filed, certified, and then
provides some guidance. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note (stating that
"[p]ermission is most likely to be granted when the certification decision turns on a novel or
unsettled question of law, or when, as a practical matter, the decision on certification is likely
dispositive of the litigation.").
36 See SAWICKI, supra note 31, at 1-87 (outlining standards of review in all circuit courts of
appeals). For example, the Seventh Circuit was the first circuit to explain a standard of review for
applications under Rule 23(f). Id. The court defined three categories of instances in which
review is appropriate. See Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834-35 (7th Cir.
1999). First, when the denial of class certification ends the plaintiff's case. Id. at 834. Second,
when the classification allowance raises the stakes so high for the defendant that he will be forced
to settle rather than proceed with a "bet the company" trial. Id. at 834-35. Third, when a
fundamental legal issue needs clarification. Id. at 835.
37 SAWICKI, supra note 31, at 1-90.

38 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 23(f)).
39 See SAWICKI, supra note 31, at 1-91 to 1-96 (detailing instances of Rule 23(f) appeals).
40 See cases cited infra note 50 (holding requirement to look beyond pleadings at certification
stage); see also Dickey, supra note 16, at 420 (discussing recent class certification issues in
federal appellate court decisions); Susan E. Hurd & Michael Johnson, 2d Circuit s 'IPO' Ruing,
THE NAT'L L. J., Jan. 29, 2007, at 15 (arguing for allowance of full record on Rule 23 at class
certification stage).
41 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
42 Coffee, Jr., supra note 1, at 5 (listing factors allowing automatic certification). However,

20091

CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION

generally settled.43 Recently, the circuit courts have issued conflicting
opinions addressing the way trial courts should certify a class in securities

cases. 44

Particularly, the "merits" inquiry and the "fraud-on-the-market"

doctrine received attention.45
1. Circuit Split Over the Extent of the "Merits" Inquiry When

Evaluating Class Certification
The source of the appellate court conflict is the appropriate
evidentiary standard-the extent of inquiry into the merits of a casenecessary to satisfy class certification requirements. 46 Courts take two very
different approaches to class certification.4 7 The minority stance is that the
class certification decision should be made "as soon as practicable after the

commencement of the action" and be "tailored to facts emerging in
discovery.

48

The minority courts, using the "some showing" standard,

"[f]ollowing the Supreme Court decision in Eisen v. Carlisle& Jacquelin, courts have struggled
to define with precision the standards governing a district judge's adjudication of a motion for
class certification under Rule 23." See DECHERT LLP, SECOND CIRCUIT IMPOSES STRINGENT
BURDENS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 23 1 (2006), http://www.dechert.com/

library/WCSL 12-06_Alert.pdf.
43 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 1, at 5 (detailing Second Circuit Rule 23 standards). For
example, the Second Circuit explained that plaintiffs only had to make some showing of
certification requirements and not satisfy the preponderance of evidence standard as required by
other circuits. See Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292 (2d Cir. 1999).
44

See JONATHAN C.

DICKEY, CURRENT TRENDS IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LITIGATION,

American Law Institute - American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education (June 28-29,
2007), at 759.
45 Id. (noting diverging federal court securities class certification opinions and recent
Supreme Court decisions insisting "everything ... now up for grabs").
46 See Dickey, supra note 16, at 421 (characterizing circuit split based on merits inquiry).
47 See id.

49 See id. (citing Oscar Private Equity Inv. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 266
(5th Cir. 2007)); see also Kent Yalowitz & Elizabeth A. Wells, The Importance of Discovery
from "Absent" Class Members. It Can Make all the Difference on the Motion to Certif.,
N.Y.L.J., June 18, 2007, at S8 (suggesting pre-certification discovery from absent class members
useful for deciding Rule 23 conformity); Christopher M. Mason, Esq. & Richard A. McGuirk,
Esq., The In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation Class Certification Reversal: How
Far Will the Ripples Spread?, Nixon Peabody LLP Class Action Alert: Recent Developments in
Class Action Law, Dec. 12, 2006 at 3, http://www.nixonpeabody.com/ publications detail3.asp?
id=1621 (implying discovery into case merits may be necessary at class certification stage). In
2003, Rule 23 was amended to require that the class certification decision be made "at an early
The advisory committee's notes approved
practicable time." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
"controlled discovery into the merits" of Rule 23 issues and advised that a court should refuse to
certify until all Rule 23 requirements are met. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) advisory committee's notes;
see also In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 39 (2d Cir. 2006) (commenting on
significance of 2003 Rule 23 amendments).
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49
find that class certification is "divorced from the merits of the claim.,
The majority of circuit courts disavow that certification is always divorced

from any inquiry into the merits of the case. 50

These courts adopt a

"rigorous analysis" standard in deciding class certification.5 1 The district

court must make sure that every Rule 23 requirement is met before
certifying a class. 52 Confusion arises when a Rule 23 requirement overlaps
with the merits of the case. 53 When an overlap occurs, the conflict

becomes whether the trial court has the authority to conduct an inquiry into
the merits during the class certification stage.54
49 See Oscar Private Equity lnvs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 266 (5th Cir.
2007) (suggesting outdated view to keep separate merits inquiry from certification
determination). But see In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d
Cir. 2001) (deciding district court's "function at class certification stage was not to determine
whether plaintiffs had stated a cause of action or whether they would prevail on the merits, but
rather whether they had shown, based on methodology that was not fatally flawed, that the
requirements of Rule 23 were met."); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292
(2d Cir. 1999) (concluding plaintiffs must make "some showing" in order to satisfy class
certification burden of proof). "Some showing" may take the form of expert opinions,
uncontested allegations in the complaint, and evidence from an affidavit or live testimony. See In
re IPO, 471 F.3d at 30.
o See Dickey, supra note 16, at 421; see also In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1,
6 (lst Cir. 2005) (aligning with majority view that district court entitled to look beyond
pleadings); Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 566-67 (8th Cir. 2005) (agreeing with circuit
majority that inquiry into merits may be required to meet certification requirements); Gariety v.
Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004) (arguing for courts to look beyond
pleadings to ensure all certification requirements are met); Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695,
712 (1Ilth Cir. 2004) (recognizing evidence pertaining to Rule 23 requirements often embodies
merits of litigation); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 166
(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs. Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001))
("Before deciding whether to allow a case to proceed as a class action, . . . [courts] should make
whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23."). These circuits hold that if
courts only consider the pleadings, then "parties would have wide latitude to inject frivolous
issues to bolster or undermine a finding of predominance." Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans,
Class Certificationand the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1269 (2002).
51 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (outlining instances of merits inquiry). In
application, "it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings ....
Gen. Tel. Co.
of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
52 See Dickey, supra note 16, at 422 (stating prerequisite for every Rule 23 requirement prior
to class certification).
i3 See id. (identifying problem when Rule 23 requirements intersect with merits of suit).
54 See id. (presenting conundrum of whether judge may conduct merits inquiry at
certification). The creation of the inter and intra circuit conflicts lies with two Supreme Court
decisions. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 147; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 156 (1974).
In Falcon, the Court determined that a class action "may only be certified if the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied."
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161. The Falcon Court noted that "actual, not presumed, conformance with
Rule 23(a) remains ... indispensable." Id. at 160. Most significantly, the Falcon Court held that
"1class determination generally involves considerations that are 'enmeshed in the factual and legal
issues comprising the plaintiff's causes of action."' Id. (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) and Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Landeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963)). In
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2. The Second Circuit's "Rigorous Analysis" Determination

The Second Circuit acknowledged Rule 23's uncertainty and
clarified the standards governing class certification motions in its recent
decision in In re IPO. 55 The court determined the appropriate standards
that govern a district judge in adjudicating a motion for class certification
Specifically, the court addressed whether the 2003
under Rule 23.56
amendments to Rule 23 are consistent with the "some showing" standard
that the Second Circuit utilized in previous decisions. 7
The Second
Circuit dealt the plaintiffs bar a significant blow by rejecting the lenient
"some showing standard" and insisting on a more stringent standard.. 5
In addition, the court acknowledged the troublesome issue that
arises when a Rule 23 requirement overlaps with a merits issue. 59 In

1974, however, the Eisen Court cautioned: "We find nothing in either the language or history of
Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit
in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action." Eisen, 417 Ii S. at 177.
The Eisen Court reasoned that a defendant may be prejudiced in future proceedings when there is
a preliminary determination of the merits during class certification. Id. at 178. Many circuit
courts interpreted this decision as an absolute ban on issues of fact at the class certification stage
wNhen the facts overlap with the underlying merits of the lawsuit. See David L. Yohai & David.
R. Singh, Otside Counsel:
A More Rigorous Approach to Class-Cert~fieation Motions,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 22, 2007, at 4 (addressing class certification concerns). Thus, most courts "simply
accepted allegations on such 'overlap' issues as true or applied relaxed standards of proof, such as
the district court's 'some showing standard' ... [thereby] making it relatively easy to certify class
actions."

See AKIN

GUMP

STRAUSS

HAUER

&

FELD

LLP, SECOND CIRCUIT

REQUIRES

HEIGtTENED STANDARD OF PROOF FOR CLASS CERTIFICATIONS EVEN IF MERITS ISSUES ARE

INVOLVED 1 (Feb. 23, 2007), http://www.akingump.com/files/Publication/a508a307-6de5-46d58392-48016e9345cf/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/db31 a4aa-eb5f-437f-a57b-4852
be03e
319/948.pdf. Further, despite the Falcon and Eisen decisions, the Supreme Court "has said little
about meeting the Rule 23 requirements." In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 33 n.4 (2d Cir. 2006).
55 See In re IPO,471 F.3d at 26.
i(,See id. (signaling broad issue before court).
57 Id. at 31. Within this broad issue the court also analyzed: 1)whether the court must make
a definitive ruling that each Rule 23 requirement must be met or whether only some showing is
enough; 2) whether a Rule 23 requirement that overlaps with a merits issue lessens the standard
for a Rule 23 requirement; and 3) whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting a
motion for class certification in the pending litigation. Id. at 26-27.
-i See id. at 27 ("A district judge may not certify a class without making a ruling that each
Rule 23 requirement is met and that a lesser standard such as 'some showing' for satisfying each
requirement will not suffice...."). The court interpreted Falcon 's"rigorous analysis" language
to apply with "equal force to all Rule 23 requirements." Id. at 32 nn.3-4. While acknowledging
that "until now, our Court has been less than clear as to the applicable standards for class
certification... [,]" the court concluded that the use of"some showing" standard was erroneous.
Id.at 32. Thus, the tougher standard will make it difficult for small investors to find counsel to
pursue individual suits. See Nathan Koppel & Paul Davies, What to Do if Your Class-Action Suit
Dies -- Small Investors Face Choice Ater Ruling in Big IPO Case; The Prospectsfor Going Solo,
WALL ST.J., Dec. 7, 2006, at Dl.
It i re IPO, 471 F.3d at 41. The court aligned itself with Gariet',Szabo, and all other
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examining this dilemma, the court evaluated Eisen and concluded that there
was no basis for finding that a specific Rule 23 requirement was not
established just because it overlapped with the merits of the case. 60 The
court held that the statement in Eisen that courts considering certification
may not look into the merits of a case was "made in a case in which the
district judge's merits inquiry had nothing to do with determining the
requirements for class certification.",6' Thus, the Second Circuit in In re
IPO mandates trial courts to use the rigorous analysis standard when
making certification determinations even when the analysis compels
inquiry into the merits of the case.62
3. Effects of In Re IPO in Other Circuits
Since the In re IPO decision, the Fifth Circuit has issued two
63
decisions reversing class certification orders in securities class actions.
The Fifth Circuit, like the Second Circuit, disavowed the view that
certification is always divorced from an inquiry into the merits of a case. 64
For example, in Regents of the University of California v. Credit Suisse
First Boston (USA), Inc.,65 Enron shareholders brought suit against three
investment banks for allegedly participating in fraudulent behavior that led
decisions that required "definitive assessment of Rule 23 requirements, notwithstanding their
overlap with merits issues. As Gariety usefully pointed out, the determination as to a Rule 23
requirement is made only for purposes of class certification and is not binding on the trier of
facts, even if that trier is the class certification judge." Id.
60 See id. at 33 (explaining court's reasoning).
61 Id. at 33. "In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the
plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether
the requirements of Rule 23 are met." Id. (quoting Miller v. Mackey Int'l, 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th
Cir. 1971)).

62 In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 27. The court concluded that a district court: 1) may certify a class
only after making a finding that all Rule 23 requirements are met and that "some showing"
standard will not suffice; 2) must make such determination even if there is an overlap between
Rule 23 requirement and a merits issue; 3) must assess all evidence; and 4) may not certify cases
pending on this appeal as class actions. Id. The prevailing viewpoint is that a court must
examine whether all Rule 23 requirements are met even if the process requires the court to
resolve issues that overlap with the merits of the case. See supra note 50 and accompanying text
(determining preliminary inquiry into merits at class certification stage necessary to determine
Rule 23 status).
63 See infra text accompanying notes 64-70 (discussing Fifth Circuit case law reversing class
certification by following merits inquiry).
64 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372,
381 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1120 (2008) (finding no compelling Fifth Circuit or
Supreme Court precedential support to disallow merits inquiry); see also Oscar Private Equity
Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding obligation to ensure
Rule 23 requirements met not diminished by overlapping requirements/merits issue).
65 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007).
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to Enron's collapse. 66 The Fifth Circuit reversed class certification and
held that on a Rule 23(f) appeal, "this court can, and in fact must, review
the merits of the district court's theory of liability insofar that they also
concern issues relevant to class certification., 67 Furthermore, in Oscar
Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc.,65 the Fifth Circuit
overturned a class certified by a Texas federal court because the plaintiffs
failed to prove loss causation. 69 The majority held, "district courts often
tread too lightly on Rule 23 requirements that overlap with the lOb-5
merits, out of mistaken belief that merits questions may never be addressed
at the class certification stage. 7 °
The lone dissenter lies in the Ninth Circuit. 7' Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.72 is not a securities case, yet is indicative of the Circuit's most

recent treatment of class action certification. 73 This case involved a Title
VII (of the 1964 Civil Rights Act) action alleging that Wal-Mart was
responsible for sex discrimination against its female employees. 74 In
upholding the plaintiffs' class, the court established a lenient standard for
district court review of the plaintiffs' certification evidence.7 5 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit holds its district courts to a less demanding "sufficiency of
evidence" standard, while the majority of courts utilize a "rigorous
analysis" standard. 76
Despite this opinion, the Ninth Circuit indicated it could review the

67

See id.
at 377-79 (discussing facts of case).
Id. at 381 (stating case holding). "The fact that an issue is relevant to both class

certification and the merits... does not preclude review of that issue." Id. at 380.
69 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007).
69 Id. at 269-70 (discussing facts of case).
"By requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate loss
causation before they may be certified as a class, Oscar functions as a means for screening out
frivolous claims while at the same time protecting businesses from coerced settlements." Recent
Case, Fifth Circuit Holds That Plaintiffs Must Prove Loss Causation Before Being Certified As A
Class- Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007), 121
HARV. L. REV. 890, 897 (2008).
70 Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 268; see also Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d
316, 321 (5th Cir. 2005) (concluding Rule 23 text requires court to find all facts favoring class
certification).
71 See infra text accompanying notes 72-76.
72 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), withdrawn & superceded by, 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir.
2007).
73 See Dukes, 509 F.3d at 1176-93 (exemplifying Ninth Circuit's treatment of
class
certification).
74 See id. at 1174-75 (discussing facts of case).
75 Id. at 1244. The court cited Eisen for support of its deferential standard, saying "the
district court was on very solid ground here as it has long been recognized that arguments
evaluating the weight of evidence or the merits of a case were improper at the class certification
stage." Id. at 1227.
76 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (outlining majority standard).
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merits in two prior decisions in the securities arena.77 For example, in
Blackie v. Barrack,7 8 the court decided that determinations relevant to
certification criteria "may require review of the same facts and the same
law presented by review of the merits.", 79 In addition, this standard was
reiterated in Hanon v. DataproductsCorp., ° in which the court stated that
trial courts are "at liberty to consider evidence which goes to the
requirements of Rule 23 even though the evidence may also relate to the
underlying merits of the case.""' Therefore, what emerges
is not only an
82
inter-circuit conflict, but also an intra-circuit conflict.
ANALYSIS
Until the United States Supreme Court resolves the circuit split, the
impact of the In re IPO decision will likely change the class certification
approach in both Second Circuit district courts and courts elsewhere. 83 An
immediate result of denial of class certification in a situation like In re IPO
84
is that individual investors will be unable to pursue a suit on their own.
Specifically, it will be difficult for an individual to procure legal
representation.8 5 The amount of damages for an individual to recover must
86
be financially rewarding in order for an attorney to take on the case.
Further, the risk of losing the suit will also make an attorney less willing to
support an individual investor in her fight against a large financial
institution.87
In addition, an inquiry into the merits will make it more difficult
88
to pass the once relatively simple class certification hurdle.
plaintiffs
for
The plaintiffs and their counsel now have the burden of satisfying the
77
78
79
SO
81

See in/ra text accompanying notes 78-82 (allowing merits inquiry in securities cases).
524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id.at 897.
976 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id.at 509 (quoting In re Unioil Sec. Litig., 107 F.R.D. 615, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1985)).

82 See supra text accompanying notes 46-81 (articulating circuit split).
X3 See in/ra notes 84-104 and accompanying text (analyzing impact ofIn re IPO decision).
X4 See Koppel & Davies, supra note 58, at DI (reasoning plaintiffs will have insufficient
economic resources to continue litigation on individual basis).
5 Id.;
see also Yalowitz & Wells, sunpra note 48, at S8 (reiterating very high stakes at class
certification stage "because of the expense of preparing and trying a class action (and the risks of
an unfavorable outcome) are generally magnified greatly as compared to an individual case").
8 See Koppel & Davies, supra note 58, at DI (arguing claims need to be "anywhere from a
hundred thousand to several million to make pursuing them worth a lawyer's time").
87 See id.(addressing difficulties for small investors to find counsel to pursue individual
suits).
88 See infit, notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing expansion of evidence to satisfy
class action burden).
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requirements for class action." As such, discovery must expand to allow a
court to comply with the standard that "all of the evidence must be assessed
as with any other threshold issue." 90 Evidence from affidavits, documents,
or testimony must be presented to determine if the class should be certified,
yet in evaluating this evidence, the judge must ensure that a Rule 23
hearing does not "extend into a protracted mini-trial of substantial portions
of the underlying litigation .... "91
The message from the In re IPO decision is clear: "plaintiffs
should be held to their burden of proof for each Rule 23 element, and that a
district court must consider all evidence relevant to such issues, including
rebuttal evidence offered by the defendants., 92 Although presenting
enough evidence will carry a substantial investment of time and resources
93
for the plaintiffs, it will likely result in satisfaction of the Rule 23 burden.
In addition, the defendant will have an opportunity to use materials
94
gathered from discovery to oppose class certification.
Given the importance of class certification in securities litigation,
the Second Circuit took a significant step toward "protecting defendants
from meritless class action by clearing up confusion around what standards
govern class certification motions. '95 As a result, insurers and financial
services have a stronger defense against plaintiffs who were previously
X' See Hurd & Johnson, supra note 40, at 15 (advising lawyers to present
enough evidence to
support Rule 23).
90 In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d. Cir. 2006). See Mason & McGuirk, supra note 48, at 3
(addressing possible discovery expansion allowing trial court resolution of relevant class
certification issues including case merits). This allowance goes beyond limiting the scope of the
court's analysis to the complaint allegations. Hurd & Johnson, supra note 40, at 15.
9] In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 41 (cautioning judge's evaluation of Rule 23 evidence). See Mason
& McGuirk, supra note 48, at 3 ("Most courts, however, will probably struggle diligently with
the opposing obligations to resolve all factual issues necessary for class certification decision,
even if those issues are 'identical to issue on merits', yet somehow at the same time try not to
examine merits.").
'-, Hurd & Johnson, supra note 40, at 15 (articulating necessity of presenting
evidence to
meet and rebut burden of proof).
93 See Yalowitz & Wells, supra note 48, at S8 ("From the perspective of a plaintiff, a
relatively modest 'up front' investment in time and resources at an early stage can provide a more
robust record for carrying the burden of showing that the case satisfied the rigorous requirements
of Rule 23.").

94 See id. The In re IPO opinion "provides ammunition" to counter the argument that a court
cannot conduct an inquiry into the case merits. Mason & McGuirk, supra note 48, at 3.
Specifically, the In re [P0 decision may aid defendants opposed to class certification because
"[e]xery class action defendant wants its evidence disputing Rule 23 requirements considered in
order to try to fend off the enormous settlement pressure often arising from certification." Id.
(quoting In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 39 n.9).
Il Yohai & Singh, supra note 54, at 16. The Second Circuit "provided much
needed,
practical guidance to lower courts on how best to comply with the rigorous analysis obligation."
Hturd & Johnson. supra note 40, at 15.
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certified using the minimal "some showing" standard. 96 Thus, counsel for

financial services and insurance companies will use the clarified standard
97
to protect their rights and defend against meritless class action suits.
The application of the merits inquiry attempts to prevent the high
social costs of frivolous and weak class action suits. 98 Given the dynamics

of class action suits and the prevalence of settlements, it is necessary to
allow for a rigorous review of the substantive merits and the likelihood of
success at the certification stage. 99

Lenient certification standards will

likely invite meritless class action suits that settle because a defendant will
want to avoid potentially crippling, even bankrupting, damage awards that
may result from litigating the case. 100
There lies a high probability for other circuits and the United States
Supreme Court to adopt this policy because the clear trend now is to allow
a rigorous analysis into the merits of a case. 0 1 Otherwise, plaintiffs hoping
to certify will arguably forum shop to the jurisdictions that do not apply the
rigorous standard. 10 2 Furthermore, although the In re IPO decision is10 a3
securities suit, the holding is applicable to class actions generally.
Plaintiffs have to prove each Rule 23 element by a preponderance of
evidence, thereby making it more difficult to obtain class certification in
federal court. 104

96 See Yohai & Singh, supra note 54, at 16.
97 See id. (arguing In re IPO as huge step protecting defendants from baseless class actions
by defining certification standards). Further, counsel for insurance companies and financial
services will be able to use the certification standards to defend meritless class action suits. Id.
98 Bone & Evans, supra note 50, at 1254 (arguing in favor of rigorous analysis standard for
class certification).
99 See id. (proposing judges assess all evidence whenever Rule 23 calls for inquiry into
merits-related factors).
100 See id. (reasoning because lesser standard is "weakly justified," it is unevenly applied).
101 See PERKINS COILE, SECOND CIRCUIT APPLIES STRINGENT STANDARD

FOR CLASS

CERTIFICATION IN IPO LITIGATION, Jan. 5, 2007, http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/pubs-detail.
aspx?publication = 1031 &op=updates.pdf (addressing likelihood of other courts to adopt In re IPO
holding).
102

See WILLIS NORTH AMERICA, WALL STREET VICTORY FOR UNDERWRITERS IN IPO

LADDERING CASES: MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS, (Feb. 2007) Issue 6, page 2, available
at http://www.willis.com/documents/publications/industries/financialinstitutions/FIAlertO2O7.pdf
(acknowledging possibility of forum shopping if class action ban).
103 Hurd & Johnson, supra note 40, at 15. The decision "provided practical guidance to
lower courts on how to comply with rigorous analysis, it will have implications for any putative
class where for example a defendant will ague 'that the class should not be certified because
individualized issues predominate over common ones.' Id.
104 See AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, supra note 54, at 1 (concluding second
circuit's decision will make it more difficult to obtain federal class certification); see also Mason
& McGuirk, supra note 48, at 3 ("Arguably the amount of effort now necessary to make the
certification decision will be greater, thus, courts are less likely to certify class.").
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CONCLUSION

While it is true that historically, securities class actions were
almost always certified, the current circuit court trend suggests the opposite
will occur in the future. It is likely that an inquiry into the merits of a case
will occur when the rigorous analysis standard is used. As a result, courts
must ensure that every Rule 23 requirement is met. At the class
certification stage, the judge must allow parties to present a full record of
the Rule 23 requirements. The most efficient way of doing so is to expand
discovery. From the defendant's perspective, pre-certification discovery
will provide a fair opportunity to oppose class certification. In addition, the
judge must hear evidence from both sides and must be persuaded that the
fact at issue is ascertained. At the same time, she must ensure that
adjudicating the motion for class certification does not end up as a mini
trial on the issues.
The rigorous analysis standard necessitates that the plaintiff
proposed class is prepared to satisfy each Rule 23 requirement with
adequate evidence. As such, plaintiffs' counsel must be on notice. This is
not a heavy burden. The purpose of the standard is to prevent litigating
meritless claims which is a waste of the court's time and resources. The
flood gates will not re-open following the decisions to not certify.
Specifically, individual investors are unlikely to pursue a lawsuit because
the cost of doing so is extraordinary. Therefore, the contraction of
securities class action litigation will continue.
MargaretAnne Caulfield

